Design reconstition on t h e transfer bay bridge crane based upon a graded approach that provides the basis for the Safety classification of existing Structures, systems, and components ( S S C ) .
Introduction
This supporting document provides the bases for the safety classification for the K Basin transfer bay bridge crane and the bases for the Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) safety classification. A table is presented that delineates the safety significant components.
This safety classification is based on a review of the Authorization Basis (AB). This Authorization Basis review was performed regarding AB and design baseline issues. The primary issues are:
I.
2.
What is the AB for the safety classification of the transfer bay bridge crane?
What does the SSC safety classification "Safety Significant" or "Safety Significant for Design Only" mean for design requirements and quality requirements for procurement, installation and maintenance (including replacement of parts) activities for the crane during its expected life time?
The AB information on the crane was identified based on review of Department of EnergyRichland Office (RL) and Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project correspondence, K Basin Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and RL Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs) of SNF Project SAR submittals. The relevant correspondence, actions and activities taken and substantive directions or conclusions of these documents are provided in Appendix A.
Background
The 105 K transfer bay cranes were built in the early 1950's in accordance with the Electric Overhead Crane Institute, the predecessor to the Crane Manufacturers Association of America, Inc. (CMAA). In 1982, UNC Nuclear Industries replaced both trolleys in accordance with CMAA. In 1998, the KW Basin trolley was replaced with a new 32-ton trolley to meet the requirements of the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) mission. An upgrade for the KE Basin trolley has been identified but not yet implemented.
The Department of Energy (DOE) had concluded that violations to the Design, Procurement, Work Process, and Quality Improvement provisions of 10 CFR 830.120 occurred in the Spent Nuclear Project (SNFP), K-Basins, and other Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) facilities, External Letter, EA-1 000-04, "Preliminary Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty $330,000 and Compliance Order," (Michaels 1999). Consequently, the Facilities Evaluation Board (FEB) performed an evaluation audit. Their evaluation stated "The KE and KW transfer bay bridge cranes are identified as safety significant on the SEL and K Basins authorization basis upgrades to the cranes were procured as safety significant (SS) and they have been maintained as general service equipment", Internal Letter FEB-99-043, "Extent of Condition Phase 2 Review of Final Report" (Flynn 1999). They further stated that "The requirements in I O CFR 830.120 ["Quality Assurance Requirement"] specify safety significance will be accounted for in the design, procurement, performance, and testing. Although the crane was procured and supplied as safety significant, the turnover to the plant and adjustments to the existing maintenance programs to address the safety significant components were not accounted for."
ISSUE 1: What is the AB for the safety classification of the transfer bay bridge crane?
In response to RL, External letter, 97-SFD-252, "Contract No. DE-AC06-96RL13200 -Safety Classification and Designation As Important-To-Safety (ITS) of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Project Cranes and Handling Equipment," (Sieracki 1997) , the SNF Project provided its position regarding the safety classification of the crane in External letter, FDH-9761261 R4, "Safety Classification of Cranes and Handling Equipment," (Williams 1997) . Williams (1997) . RL conditionally accepted with questions the classification in Table 2 , Attachment 1 of Williams (1997) . This The drops of loads from the crane that can impact safety class confinement barriers of the basin or the MCO can be categorized into four scenarios:
(1) drops of equipment and other related loads, including those induced from the design basis seismic event, impacting the confinement barrier of the pool (2) drops of the cask-MCO, including those induced from the design basis seismic event, impacting the confinement barrier of the pool drop of the crane due to structural failures induced by a seismic event impacting the confinement barrier of the pool drops of the cask-MCO, including those induced from the design basis seismic event, impacting the confinement barrier of the MCO.
These scenarios are addressed differently for the crane at K Basins:
Prevention or mitigation of drops of equipment and other related loads impacting the confinement barrier of the pool -addressed by administrative controls in Table 3 RL letters associated with the 'Alternative Approach' address the issues related to a cask-MCO drop as a risk package encompassing all drop initiators, including seismic initiated drops. Seismic initiated drops were not explicitly identified as needing separate or expanded consideration. As an indication of acceptability, the frequency of operational drops (numheriyear) of a cask-MCO is said to he on the same order of magnitude as the frequency of the seismic design basis event, leading to the understanding that the RL and the SNF Project accepted the management of risk of the occurrence of seismic induced drop events as well as operational induced drop events of the cask-MCO. This includes consideration of taking emergency response to a cask-MCO drop under the scenarios of with and without supply of offsite power.
In summary, this AB review determined that RL's definition of the 'Safety Significant' function of the crane is that there is not a loss of safety class confinement barrier of the basin pool, nor the MCO, as a result of a drop of a load from the crane. This is satisfied by administrative controls, management of risk and acceptance of analysis. As such, given that issues regarding drops of equipmentiother loads and the cask-MCO are resolved by administrative controls and the management of risk, the current AB requires only demonstration of adequate design that the crane maintain structural integrity during and after a design basis earthquake and that the MCO will maintain its confinement function and its criticality geometry control functions after a drop from the crane. This demonstration is consistent with 'safety significant for design only'.
ISSUE 2:
What does the SSC safety classification "Safety Significant" or "Safety Significant for Design Only" mean for requirements design and quality requirements for procurement, installation and maintenance (including replacement of parts) activities for the crane during its expected life time?
In its response to Sieracki (1997) , Williams (1998) provides the SNF Project position regarding the safety classification of the crane. The basis for compliance of the crane to applicable Department of Energy (DOE) and Hanford Site requirements is in Section I.A.2. The thrust of this argument is that the crane meets the specified design codes and standards of applicable DOE and Hanford Site requirements. These are 'CMAA, ANSI B30.XX', for General Service (GS) and Safety Significant (SS) cranes and 'ASME-NOG-1' for Safety Class (SC) cranes'. K Basin cranes were 'built to' CMAA-70, "Specification for Top Running Bridge and Gantry Type Multiple Girder Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes", ANSI B30.2, "Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Single or Multiple Girder, Top Running Trolley Hoist", and ANSI B30.10, "Hooks" with a seismic evaluation for the bridge, structure and trolley overturn to ASME NOG-1, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)" and AISC, "Manual of Steel Construction, Allowable Stress Design".
Operational activities, such as hoisting inspection, testing, and maintenance (including replacement ofparts), related to the crane are to be in accordance with the Hanford Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual (Manual) . The Hanford Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual requires that crane maintenance files be established. However, a preliminary review of the Manual indicates that the Manual provides requirements for such activities but does not distinguish such requirements by safety classification, that is, the Manual does not define sets of requirements for Safety Class (SC), Safety Significant (SS) and General Service (GS). the operational requirements for the crane are the same for GS, SS or SC classifications.
The recommended quality classification of the Transfer Bay Bridge Crane is based on HNF-PRO-259, "Graded Quality Assurance" and AP-EN-6-028, "Graded Approach". The 'Graded Approach' Checklist in these procedures were completed and are in Appendix B. The results of implementing this Administrative Procedure found the following risk levels and recommended the quality levels be implemented as follows: 'The structural elements of this SSC are assigned a moderate risk and associated quality level (QL) 2. The controls for the SSC are assigned low risk and associated QL 3 for component identification. The power supply cables and control wiring are assigned low risk and are identified as QL 0.'
As such,
Hanford PRO-097, Table B -l is in error and a correction through Corrective Action Management (FDH-PI-WA-EG-1999 160 I) has been submitted. The requirements identified in this document identify the correct requirements.
In summary, this AB review reaffirmed that the transfer bay bridge crane meets the applicable design codes and standards and seismic evaluations were performed in accordance with applicable design codes. Further implementation of the "Graded Approach" procedure determined appropriate Quality requirements for ongoing operational maintenance.
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Conclusion
The AB safety classification of the transfer bay bridge crane was determined to be Safety Significant with satisfaction of this classification by administrative controls, management of risk and acceptance of analysis. As such, given those issues regarding drops of equipmentlother loads and the cask-MCO are resolved by administrative controls and the management of risk, the 'Safety Significant' function of the crane is to maintain structural integrity during and after a design basis earthquake. -Conditionally accepts with questions the classification in Table  2 , Attachment 1 of FDH-9761261 R4. This Table says 'SS', not 'SS for design only' -'Agreement by DOE is based on FDH's assertions and conclusions on drops analyses, that these analyses are valid and that no breach of safety class confinement barriers, e.g., the K Basins pool or Multi-Canister Overpack, will occur," -RL letter states that: "Crucial to the designation that the K Basin crane is safety-significant is showing that a dropped load will nor breach the pool concrete such that the safety class function ofthe basin is maintained for a design basis accident" and "RL concurrence on the classification of the K Basin crane as safety significant is based on the FDH statement that the basin will not be punctured by a drop of a load. The Basin Safety Analysis Report shall document the conclusions of this analysis" -RL notes that the SAR 3B reflects the upgrade ofthe crane capacity to 32 tons, but prohibits lifting of loads near the cooling pool to limits in Table 3 -10, "on Perforation Criteria', which effectively precludes damage to the Basin walls and floor. The only damage under these restrictions would be dropping items on the fuel during seismic events or other upset conditions.
-RL also imposed a Special condition of Approval restricting all loads from being lifted above the pool using the crane or placing the trolley itself above the cooling pool until the crane classification questions in RL letter 98-SFD-026 are addressed by FDH and approved by RL.
-The SER noted sufficient analysis was not provided to demonstrate that upgraded [to transfer bay bride rating?] 'bridge crane' will not fall during a seismic event. Restrictions on crane were imposed until sufficient analysis is reviewed & approved by RL.
-Project analyses in ECN 645558 -RL accepts analyses and independent reviews were performed per requirements in 6430. IA -RL removed restrictions of moving the trolley over the cooling pool -RL accepts SNF Project seismic analysis of the crane which demonstrates that the unloaded crane trolley will not fall down during a seismic event. RL removes restrictions on crane trolley movement over the cooling pool.
-The intent of this letter (98-SFD-089) was clarified by 99-SFD-081 that crane trolley could move fuel and inaterial above the cooling pool; however, these movements must remain in compliance with limits in Table 3 -10, Provides SNF Project position, analyses and classification of the crane as 'SS for design only' in -RL approved SAR amendment 3Ei3F which resolved the concern with the crane safety classification by classifying the crane as 'SS for design only' in Table 2-9 -RL re-iterates its approvals of SAR amendment 3E/3F in its letter 98-SFD-176 on 9/18/98 that resolved the concern with the crane safety classification.
-This letter (99-SFD-081) clarified RL Letter 98-SFD-089 that crane trolley could move fuel and material above the cooling pool; however, these movements inust remain in compliance with limits in Table 3 -10.
-FEB finding that 'The KE and KW transfer bay bridge cranes are identified as safety significant (SS) and they have been maintained as general service equipment.' Further, the FEB stated that 'The requirements in IOCFR 830.120 specify safety significant will be accounted for in the design, procurement, performance and testing. Although the crane supplied as safety significant, the turnover to the plant and adjustments to the existing maintenance programs to address the safety significant components were not accounted for.' -FEB is an internal site management organization, not a regulatory authority -Proposes 'Alternative Approach' regarding drops of the cask-MCO -Does not specifically raise crane issues regarding its safety classification -Accepts proposed 'Alternative Approach' regarding drops of the cask-MCO -Does not specifically address crane issues regarding its safety classification 
OVER-ALL JUSTIFICATION:
The safety significant function of the transfer bay bridge crane is reinforced with the periodic inspections in accordance with the Hanford Site Hoisting and Rigging Manual. Because of the design and authorization bases, the transfer bay bridge crane is classified as safety significant and QL 2. The primary cause of crane failures in indoor facilities resulting in structural collapse is undetected degradation of the crane components through age and use. For this reason, the Surveillance Procedures associated with this SSC is identified as Safety Significant requiring strict documentation and control of the inspections and any resulting corrective actions.
The control system for the crane is under strict configuration control, including revision control for the software operating parameters. The configuration controls for the hardware controls are standard commercial practice for a piece of equipment of this nature and therefore are assigned to QL3, to ensure trace-ability of component identification.
The power supply to this crane is a commercial standard power supply. The control wiring is standard industrial control wiring. Basic wiring is considered skill of the craft for electricians; therefore, the power and control wiring is identified to be QLO.
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Structures, Systems and Components Classification
Safety significant subsystems and components of the KW transfer bay bridge crane are identified in Table 1 
